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OPINION 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 
Michael Portanova pleaded guilty to receiving child 
pornography.1  Applying a statutory sentencing enhancement, 
the District Court determined that his prior Pennsylvania 
conviction for possessing and distributing child pornography2 
was a conviction relating to the possession of child 
pornography and sentenced him to a mandatory fifteen-year 
term of imprisonment.3   
 
 
 
1 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (b)(1). 
2 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6312(c)–(d). 
3 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1).   
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We conclude, first, that under our “looser categorical 
approach,” 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1)’s “relating to” language 
does not require an exact match between the state and federal 
elements of conviction, and second, that the provision is not 
unconstitutionally vague.  Accordingly, we will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
In 2017, Portanova admitted to downloading child 
pornography onto his cell phone, on which investigators found 
sixty-three videos depicting minors engaged in sexually 
explicit conduct.  Portanova subsequently pleaded guilty to 
receipt of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1).  An individual who violates 
§ 2252(a)(2) is subject to a fifteen-year mandatory minimum 
sentence if that person “has a prior conviction . . . under the 
laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual 
abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.”4  
This enhancement also applies to a prior state conviction 
“relating to . . . the production, possession, receipt, mailing, 
sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child 
pornography.”5  Portanova had previously been convicted of 
possessing and distributing child pornography under 
Pennsylvania law.6 
 
At sentencing and over Portanova’s objection, the 
District Court concluded that his state conviction triggered the 
 
 
4 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1).  
5 Id. 
6 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6312(c)–(d). 
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fifteen-year mandatory minimum enhancement.  Portanova 
appeals this sentence.   
 
II.7 
 
On appeal, Portanova makes two arguments that the 
District Court erred in concluding that his conviction triggered 
the mandatory minimum provision.  First, he asserts that 
§ 2252(b)(1) requires a narrow analysis under the formal 
categorical approach, and that state child pornography offenses 
that are broader than the federal child pornography definition, 
including his, cannot constitute mandatory minimum predicate 
offenses.8  Second, Portanova argues that § 2252(b)(1)’s broad 
“relating to” language is void for vagueness.9  Accordingly, 
Portanova argues that he is not subject to the fifteen-year 
mandatory minimum enhancement.  
  
 
 
7 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  In evaluating the District 
Court’s imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence, we 
must interpret a statute, so our review is plenary.  United States 
v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651, 671 (3d Cir. 2012).  Similarly, our 
review of a constitutional challenge to a statute is plenary.  
United States v. John-Baptiste, 747 F.3d 186, 200 (3d Cir. 
2014). 
8 See United States v. Reinhart, 893 F.3d 606, 609–10 
(9th Cir. 2018). 
9 See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556–
57 (2015); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350–51 
(1964). 
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A. 
 
Portanova challenges the District Court’s broader 
application of the mandatory minimum sentence enhancement 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1).  He asserts that the District 
Court should have applied the formal categorical approach, 
construing “relating to” narrowly.  Because the Pennsylvania 
child pornography statute criminalizes conduct not covered 
under federal law, he argues, it could not constitute a 
§ 2252(b)(1) predicate offense. 
 
1. 
 
To determine whether Portanova’s prior conviction 
triggers the § 2252(b)(1) enhancement, we begin with the 
categorical approach.10  Under this approach, “the sentencing 
court can look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory 
definition of the prior offense.”11  In other words, it may look 
 
 
10 United States v. Galo, 239 F.3d 572, 582–83 (3d Cir. 
2001) (applying the categorical approach to an analogous 
enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)) (citing Taylor v. 
United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990)).  Similar to 
§ 2252(b)(1), the version of § 2251(d) that was in effect when 
Galo was decided provides for mandatory sentencing 
enhancements, of different magnitudes, where a defendant 
“has one prior conviction under this chapter [18 U.S.C. § 2251 
et seq.], . . . or under the laws of any State relating to the sexual 
exploitation of children.”  Galo, 239 F.3d at 576 (alterations in 
original).   
11 Galo, 239 F.3d at 577 (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–
02).  Contrary to Portanova’s arguments, this is a legal, rather 
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to “the elements . . . of a defendant’s prior offenses, and not ‘to 
the particular facts underlying those convictions.’”12  Under the 
formal categorical approach,13 we line up the elements of the 
state crime of conviction with the federal generic offense, that 
is, “the offense as commonly understood,”14 and determine if 
 
 
than factual determination that depends only on the “fact of a 
prior conviction,” an explicit exception to Apprendi v. New 
Jersey’s teaching that “any fact that increases the penalty for a 
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).   
12 Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013) 
(quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600); see also United States v. 
Dahl, 833 F.3d 345, 350 (3d Cir. 2016) (“The elements, not the 
facts, are key.”).  
13 We have variously referred to this usual application 
of the categorical approach as the “strict categorical approach,” 
Quinteros v. Attorney Gen. United States, 945 F.3d 772, 782 
(3d Cir. 2019), “traditional categorical approach,” United 
States v. Peppers, 899 F.3d 211, 232 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal 
quotation marks removed), and “formal categorical approach,” 
Rosa v. Attorney Gen. United States, 950 F.3d 67, 75 (3d Cir. 
2020).   
14 Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2247 (2016).  
Mathis addressed Armed Career Criminal Act predicates such 
as burglary, id., whose narrow common law definition the 
Court rejected in favor of “the generic sense in which the term 
is now used in the criminal codes of most States,” Taylor, 495 
U.S. at 598.  In the immigration context, we have termed the 
federal reference statute delimiting the federal generic offense 
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they match.15  A prior conviction counts as a sentencing 
enhancement predicate “if its elements are the same as, or 
narrower than, those of the generic offense[, b]ut if the crime 
of conviction covers any more conduct than the generic 
offense,” it does not.16  
  
As we have previously recognized, the present statute 
and circumstances are “quite different” from the 18 U.S.C. 
 
 
the “federal analog.”  Rosa, 950 F.3d at 75; see also Salmoran 
v. Attorney Gen. United States, 909 F.3d 73, 78 (3d Cir. 2018). 
15 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249; Williams v. Attorney Gen. 
United States, 880 F.3d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 2018), cert. denied 
sub nom. Williams v. Whitaker, 139 S. Ct. 863 (2019). 
16 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248.  This comparison is 
“straightforward when a statute sets out a single (or 
‘indivisible’) set of elements to define a single crime.”  Id.  
Other, “divisible” statutes “list elements in the alternative, and 
thereby define multiple crimes.”  Id. at 2249.  If so, we employ 
a “modified categorical approach,” enabling a limited factual 
inquiry.  Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283–84.  The parties do not 
propose this approach here, and we have suggested that a 
similarly-organized statute is not divisible.  See Salmoran, 909 
F.3d at 77 n.7 (noting no dispute as to the indivisibility of N.J. 
Stat. § 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b)); see also Reinhart, 893 F.3d at 618 
(citing Chavez-Solis v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 
2015) (California Penal Code § 311.4(d)’s definition of “sexual 
conduct” “simply lists numerous ways in which an image may 
be considered to depict ‘sexual conduct’” and is thus not 
divisible)). 
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§ 924(e) context.17  Consistent with our treatment of the 
analogous “relating to” language in 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d), 
§ 2252(b)(1) “does not require a sentencing court to determine 
if the prior conviction satisfies the generic elements of a crime 
as does [18 U.S.C. § 924(e)],” under our usual, formal 
categorical approach.18  Instead, § 2252(b)(1) requires only 
that Portanova’s previous state conviction be one “relating to 
. . . the . . . possession . . . of child pornography.”19  In other 
contexts, we have applied this broader “relating to” language 
under a somewhat different inquiry, which we have termed the 
“looser categorical approach.”20  This approach does not 
require a precise match between the federal generic offense and 
state offense elements.21  So too here.  “[T]he phrase ‘relating 
to’ must be ‘read expansively’ and ‘encompass[es] crimes 
other than those specifically listed in the federal statutes.’”22  
  
In determining what constitutes “possession . . . of child 
pornography,” we must also consider whether the term is 
 
 
17 Galo, 239 F.3d at 577, 581 (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 
600–02). 
18 Id. at 581; see Denis v. Attorney Gen. of the United 
States, 633 F.3d 201, 210 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[I]n deciding 
whether a conviction is ‘related to’ another offense, . . . crimes 
of conviction can be ‘related to’ a listed offense without 
containing what might be viewed as an essential element.”).  
19 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1). 
20 Williams, 880 F.3d at 105 (quoting Flores v. Attorney 
Gen. United States, 856 F.3d 280, 286 (3d Cir. 2017)).  
21 Id. 
22 Flores, 856 F.3d at 297 (Shwartz, J., concurring) 
(quoting Denis, 633 F.3d at 209). 
  
9 
 
understood generically,23 or must be defined strictly in light of 
its federal counterparts.24  Taking into account all of the 
relevant words, and not just “child pornography,” we conclude 
that “the production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, 
distribution, shipment, or transportation of child 
pornography,” like “aggravated sexual abuse,” “sexual abuse,” 
and “abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward” is not 
collectively a defined term and is best understood 
generically.25  Under this generic treatment, the offense should 
 
 
23 Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2247; see also United States v. 
Sullivan, 797 F.3d 623, 636 (9th Cir. 2015) (defining offenses 
“based on the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning 
of the statutory words”).   
24 Reinhart, 893 F.3d at 611 (“To ascertain the generic 
federal definition, we look to the federal definition of ‘child 
pornography.’”).  Lockhart v. United States outlines this 
dichotomy.  136 S. Ct. 958, 968 (2016).  As we explain in 
Section II.A.2, infra, other circuits have split on the appropriate 
treatment of individual terms in § 2252.  Reinhart applied the 
latter, statutory definition to “child pornography,” which is 
defined within the same chapter and distinguished use of the 
former, “common usage” definition of “aggravated sexual 
abuse,” “sexual abuse,” and “abusive sexual conduct involving 
a minor or ward” in Sullivan, 893 F.3d at 611. 
25 Though Galo did not expressly indicate that it defined 
“sexual exploitation of children” generically, it did just that, 
declining to refer to any statutory definitions. 239 F.3d at 581.  
There, we compared Galo’s state convictions to “sexual 
exploitation of children,” without any reference to a federal 
definition and concluded that none “establish a conviction 
under ‘laws relating to the exploitation of children.”  Id. at 
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be read as commonly understood and informed by its 
constituent terms, but not strictly cabined by them as under the 
formal categorical approach.26  Conversely, inclusion of these 
actus rei prevents the application of a sentencing enhancement 
founded upon mere association with child pornography in 
general, no matter how attenuated.27 
 
 
582–83.  Each state law criminalized a broader range of 
conduct, including “gambling, underage drinking or drug use[, 
i.e.,] conduct of any nature that tends to corrupt children[;] 
breach of duty of care[; and] indecent touching regardless of 
the victim’s age.”  Id. (emphasis added).   
26 This approach is also consistent with our conclusions 
in Pavulak, 700 F.3d at 671–73 (Delaware convictions for 
unlawful sexual contact related to sexual exploitation of 
children) and United States v. Randolph, 364 F.3d 118, 124 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (Georgia convictions for child molestation related 
to sexual exploitation of children).  Other Circuits have also 
treated these terms generically.  United States v. Mayokok, 854 
F.3d 987, 993 (8th Cir. 2017) (in review of § 2252(b)(1) 
enhancement, surveying federal definition of “child 
pornography” without requiring an exact match); United States 
v. Bennett, 823 F.3d 1316, 1325 (10th Cir. 2016) (rejecting 
narrow reading of equivalent “relating to” language in 18 
U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2)).  This generic treatment is consistent 
with the broader reading of “relating to.” See Williams, 880 
F.3d at 105 (“[T]he definition of the term ‘forgery’ is not 
enough, on its own, to answer the question of whether the [state 
crime] is ‘an offense relating to forgery.’”).   
27 See Bennett, 823 F.3d at 1323 (contrasting 
§ 2252A(b)(2) with 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), lacking an 
actus reus and potentially reaching “any crime ‘associated with 
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Nothing in the text of § 2252(b)(1) points to a different, 
narrower result.28  Congress has demonstrated a command of 
limiting language that strictly refers only to conduct 
criminalized under federal law, and it could have employed it 
here if it so intended.29 
 
 
the drug trade in general’” under a broad reading) (quoting 
Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980, 1984 (2015)).  
28 We note that this approach differs from the one we 
employed in Salmoran, which involved superficially similar 
language but which contained some important differences.  909 
F.3d at 75, 77–82.  In Salmoran, we employed the usual, formal 
categorical approach and determined that a New Jersey child 
pornography conviction under N.J. Stat. § 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b) 
was not an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(I), 
because it was not “an offense described in [18 U.S.C. § 2252] 
. . . (relating to child pornography).”  Id.  There, the “relating 
to” language is cabined by the explicit requirement that the 
offense be described by 18 U.S.C. § 2252.  Section 
1101(a)(43)(I) is thus analogous to those that limit prior 
offense predicates by strict reference to a federal statute. 
29 For example, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(e)(2) defines “state 
sex offense” as one that consists of conduct that “would be a 
Federal sex offense.”  See Bennett, 823 F.3d at 1324 (analyzing 
§ 2252A(b)(2)); see also Pavulak, 700 F.3d at 671 (applying 
the formal categorical approach to § 3559(e)(1) enhancement 
inquiry).  Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 2426(b)(1)(B) defines “‘prior 
sex offense conviction’ as an offense ‘consisting of conduct 
that would have been an offense under [this chapter, chapter 
109A, chapter 110, or section 1591].’” Bennett, 823 F.3d at 
1324 (alteration in original); see also Dahl, 833 F.3d at 349 
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Accordingly, we join several of our sister circuits in 
adopting a broader reading of “relating to” in the § 2252(b)(1) 
context.30  Under our looser categorical approach, we examine 
the statutory definitions of Portanova’s crime of conviction and 
determine whether it is categorically a law “relating to . . . the 
. . . possession . . . of child pornography,” as generically 
understood under federal law.31 
 
The Supreme Court has defined “relating to” as “to 
stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; 
refer; to bring into association with or connection with.”32  
“[W]e ‘survey [the statutory provisions’] interrelationship’ and 
consider whether there is ‘a logical or causal connection’ 
between them.”33  “We may conclude that the crimes are 
 
 
(applying formal categorical approach to same).  Conversely, 
the text of § 2252(b)(1), like that of § 2252A(b)(2), lacking 
such a narrow federal reference, does not support a more 
limited reading of “relating to.”   
30 Mayokok, 854 F.3d at 993; Bennett, 823 F.3d at 
1324 (collecting cases).   
31 See Galo, 239 F.3d at 582; see also Mayokok, 854 
F.3d at 992–93 (“[T]he question . . . is not whether the 
statutes criminalize exactly the same conduct, but whether the 
full range of conduct proscribed under [the state law] relates 
to the ‘possession . . . of child pornography’ as that term is 
defined under federal law.”).  
32 Denis, 633 F.3d at 209 (quoting Morales v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992)).   
33 Williams, 880 F.3d at 105 (quoting Flores, 856 F.3d 
at 291).   
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logically connected if they both target the same, core criminal 
conduct such that they are directly analogous.”34 
 
2. 
 
In arguing for the application of the formal categorical 
approach to § 2252(b)(1)’s “relating to” language, Portanova 
points to the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. 
Reinhart, which rejected a conclusion that equivalent “relating 
to . . . child pornography” language in § 2252(b)(2) required “a 
broader comparison between the state statutes and the federal 
statutes.”35  For the additional reasons that follow, we decline 
to adopt its rationale.   
 
Reinhart’s application of “relating to” in § 2252(b)(2) 
followed the Supreme Court’s approach in Mellouli v. Lynch.36  
Mellouli considered the application of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), which “authorizes the removal of an alien 
‘convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State 
[or] the United States . . . relating to a controlled substance (as 
defined in section 802 of Title 21).”37  There, the Supreme 
Court applied the formal categorical approach, concluding that 
a misdemeanor Kansas conviction for possession of drug 
 
 
34 Id. (quoting Flores, 856 F.3d at 291) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
35 Reinhart, 893 F.3d at 609–10, 615.   
36 135 S. Ct. at 1983.   
37 Id. at 1984 (emphasis added).   
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paraphernalia to conceal a controlled substance,38 though “by 
definition[] related to” controlled substances, was not limited 
to those controlled substances defined in 21 U.S.C. § 802 and 
was thus categorically overbroad.39  Mellouli relied on the 
“historical background of § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i),” which 
demonstrated a longstanding requirement for “a direct link 
between an alien’s crime of conviction and a particular 
federally controlled drug.”40  The government’s proposed 
broader reading of “relating to” also failed to give meaning to 
the statutory text, whose parenthetical “as defined in section 
802 of Title 21” restricted the types of controlled substances 
giving rise to removal.41  
  
An earlier Ninth Circuit post-Mellouli decision, United 
States v. Sullivan, had adopted a broader reading of “relating 
to” in § 2251(e) and § 2252(b)(2).42  Applying Mellouli’s 
framework, Sullivan concluded that § 2251(e) and § 
2252(b)(2)’s historical backgrounds and unqualified texts “did 
not require a ‘direct link’ between the state crime of conviction 
 
 
38 Specifically, Mellouli, a Tunisian national, had used 
his sock to conceal unidentified pills, acknowledged to be 
Adderall.  Id. at 1988.  
39 Id. at 1984; see also Hillocks v. Attorney Gen. United 
States, 934 F.3d 332, 345 (3d Cir. 2019). 
40 Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1990.  There, the Supreme 
Court also reasoned that the broader interpretation would have 
the “incongruous upshot” of creating harsher immigration 
consequences for drug paraphernalia possession offenses than 
possession and distribution offenses.  Id. at 1989.   
41 Id. at 1988 n.9, 1990–91.   
42 797 F.3d at 638. 
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and a particular federal statute.”43  Reinhart arrived at the 
opposite result by concluding that, whereas the terms 
“aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, [or] abusive sexual 
conduct involving a minor or ward” were not specifically 
defined terms in the same statutory chapter and may be 
considered “generic offenses,” the term “child pornography” 
was specifically defined, thus forcing a narrow reading in 
accordance with Mellouli.44  Reinhart inferred that the 
“language of [the] statute,” by this link to an explicit federal 
definition, triggered a “textual restriction[]” and favored a 
“narrower reading of ‘relating to.’”45 
   
In our view, this reliance on Mellouli is misplaced.  
Unlike the object of “relating to” in Mellouli, “a controlled 
substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21),”46 the object 
of § 2252(b)(1)’s “relating to” here is “the . . . possession . . . 
of child pornography,” an offense containing a defined term. 
Section 2252(b)(1) lacks the removal statute’s express limiting 
parenthetical, which applies with equal force to both federal 
and state convictions.47  And Reinhart’s narrow reading of 
“child pornography” fails to give sufficient weight not only to 
 
 
43 Sullivan, 797 F.3d at 640 (internal citation removed) 
(quoting Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1990).   
44 Reinhart, 893 F.3d at 614–15. 
45 Id. at 613. 
46 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). 
47 See Bennett, 823 F.3d at 1323.  Section 2252(b)(1), 
by contrast, separately and expressly identifies the federal 
convictions triggering the statutory enhancement, while 
reserving the application “relating to” language for state 
convictions.  See id. 
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the words “relating to”—an approach arguably countenanced 
by Mellouli—but also to “the . . . possession . . . of” preceding 
“child pornography,”—words absent from the statute at issue 
in Mellouli—rendering them surplusage contrary to our usual 
principles of statutory interpretation.48  
  
Although we agree that the definitions of “child 
pornography” and “sexually explicit conduct” in § 2256 are the 
appropriate starting place for determining the generic federal 
offense, § 2256’s definitions do not foreclose our use of the 
looser categorical approach.49  Reinhart, in focusing on “child 
pornography,” reads the statute too narrowly.  Moreover, 
“child pornography,” as defined in § 2256, is not itself a 
“conviction,” and is thus an inequivalent object of comparison 
under a categorical approach analysis of any stripe, better 
directed to “elements” rather than “facts.”50  It is the entire 
clause, and not just “child pornography,” that constitutes the 
federal generic offense.  As discussed, we also find it 
significant that Congress, in employing broad “relating to” 
 
 
48 See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 167 (2001) 
(“This Court’s duty to give effect, where possible, to every 
word of a statute, makes the Court reluctant to treat statutory 
terms as surplusage.”) (internal citation omitted).   
49 See Mayokok, 854 F.3d at 992 (quoting United States 
v. Sonnenberg, 556 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 2009) (taking 
§ 2256 as point of departure, “relating to” nevertheless “carries 
a broad ordinary meaning” and does not require congruence of 
state and federal statutes).   
50 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600; Galo, 239 F.3d at 578.   
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language, chose not to cabin its meaning by explicit reference 
to § 2252(a) or a definition in another federal section.51 
 
Reinhart’s approach has the additional effect of creating 
different applications to different predicate offenses in Section 
2252(b), a result whose tension Reinhart acknowledges.52  This 
is a “consequence[] Congress could not have intended” and 
contrary to the usual interpretation of statutes “as a 
symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme.”53  Because 
these predicates, taken as a whole, are undefined, the 
incongruous treatment required by Reinhart becomes even less 
tenable.  Accordingly, § 2252(b)(1) does not require complete 
congruence between federal and state predicates.54 
   
 
 
51 See Bennett, 823 F.3d at 1323 (§ 2252A(b)(2) 
enhancement “does not limit ‘child pornography’ by linking it 
to the federal definition.”).  Congress in other contexts has 
demonstrated its intent to tether sentencing predicates with 
statutory definitions elsewhere in the Code.  See id. (citing 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2426(b)(1)(B), 3559(e)(2)).   
52 Reinhart, 893 F.3d at 616 n.5. 
53 Mellouli, 135 S. Ct. at 1989 (first quoting Moncrieffe 
v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 200 (2013), then quoting FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 
(2000)). 
54 See Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 966 
(2016) (“[O]ur construction of § 2252(b)(2)’s sexual-abuse 
predicates does not rely on a general assumption that Congress 
sought full parity between all of the federal and state predicates 
in § 2252(b)(2).”); Bennett, 823 F.3d at 1324 n.11. 
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Our approach also better matches Congress’ purpose of 
ensuring that a wide range of state offenses would fall within 
§ 2252’s enhancement provisions.55  As Reinhart recognized, 
and unlike Mellouli, there is no extensive historical practice 
favoring the formal categorical approach in the § 2252(b) 
context.56   
 
While we heed Mellouli’s admonition that the words 
“relating to,” when “extended to the furthest stretch of their 
indeterminacy, stop nowhere,” we find no contradiction in the 
broader application of “relating to” under our “looser 
categorical approach” or in our generic treatment of “the . . . 
possession . . . of child pornography.”57 
  
 
 
55 See, e.g., United States v. Hubbard, 480 F.3d 341, 350 
(5th Cir. 2007) (“From the language Congress chose [in the 
analogous 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1)], we can discern its intent: 
a prior conviction for certain federal offenses warrants a 
minimum sentence, and a prior conviction for a variety of 
generic offenses under state law warrants a minimum sentence 
as well.”) (analyzing aggravated sexual abuse and other terms).   
56 Reinhart, 893 F.3d at 615 (“[U]nlike Mellouli, within 
the § 2252 context, there is no historical requirement of a 
‘direct link’ between the state crime of conviction and the 
particular federal offense conduct.”) (citing Bennett, 823 F.3d 
at 1329 (Hartz, J., dissenting)). 
57 Flores, 856 F.3d at 290 n.49 (quoting Mellouli, 135 
S. Ct. at 1990). 
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3. 
 
Accordingly, applying our broader reading of “relating 
to,” we turn our attention to the language of the statutes and 
conclude that Portanova has a prior conviction “relating to” the 
child pornography offenses described in § 2252(b)(1).   
 
The Pennsylvania statute, 18 Pa. Con. Stat. § 6312(c) 
and (d), under which Portanova was convicted, provides: 
(c) Dissemination of photographs, 
videotapes, computer depictions 
and films.—Any person who 
knowingly sells, distributes, 
delivers, disseminates, transfers, 
displays or exhibits to others, or 
who possesses for the purpose of 
sale, distribution, delivery, 
dissemination, transfer, display or 
exhibition to others, any book, 
magazine, pamphlet, slide, 
photograph, film, videotape, 
computer depiction or other 
material depicting a child under 
the age of 18 years engaging in a 
prohibited sexual act or in the 
simulation of such act commits an 
offense. 
 
(d) Child pornography.—Any 
person who intentionally views or 
knowingly possesses or controls 
any book, magazine, pamphlet, 
slide, photograph, film, videotape, 
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computer depiction or other 
material depicting a child under 
the age of 18 years engaging in a 
prohibited sexual act or in the 
simulation of such act commits an 
offense.58 
 
A “[p]rohibited sexual act” is defined in the same 
section as “[s]exual intercourse as defined in section 3101 
(relating to definitions), masturbation, sadism, masochism, 
bestiality, fellatio, cunnilingus, lewd exhibition of the genitals 
or nudity if such nudity is depicted for the purpose of sexual 
stimulation or gratification of any person who might view such 
depiction.”59 
 
In determining whether Portanova’s Pennsylvania 
convictions relate to “the . . . possession . . . of child 
pornography” under § 2252(b)(1), we must also determine 
what constitutes the federal generic offense of “possession . . . 
of child pornography.”  As discussed, we read the term 
generically, taking the federal statutory definition of “child 
pornography” as our starting frame of reference, but we do not 
confine ourselves to it.60  
 
 
58 18 Pa. Con. Stat. § 6312(c)–(d).   
59 Id. § 6312(g). 
60 See Mayokok, 854 F.3d at 992–93; see also Burgess 
v. United States, 553 U.S. 124, 129 (2008) (“Statutory 
definitions control the meaning of statutory words . . . in the 
usual case.”) (quoting Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S.S. Co., 
336 U.S. 198, 201 (1949)); cf. Reinhart, 893 F.3d at 613 
(“[A]pplying well-established statutory principles, where there 
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Federal law defines “child pornography” as “any visual 
depiction . . . of a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct.”61  In turn, at the time of the offense conduct, 
“‘sexually explicit conduct’ means actual or simulated—
(i) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, 
anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same 
or opposite sex; (ii) bestiality; (iii) masturbation; (iv) sadistic 
or masochistic abuse; or (v) lascivious exhibition of the 
genitals or pubic area of any person.”62 
 
Parsing these statutes, Portanova argues that, since the 
federal definition reaches only the “lascivious exhibition of the 
genitals or pubic area”63 and does not encompass other “nudity 
if such nudity is depicted for the purpose of sexual stimulation 
or gratification of any person who might view such 
depiction,”64 the state statute is overbroad.  Not so.65  Under 
 
 
is a federal definition of ‘child pornography’ in the same 
statutory chapter as the sentencing enhancement provision at § 
2252(b)(2), we apply that definition.”).  
61 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A). 
62 Id. § 2256(2)(A), amended by Amy, Vicky, and Andy 
Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 
115-299, § 7(c)(1)(A), 132 Stat. 4383.   
63 Id. 
64 18 Pa. Con. Stat. § 6312(g). 
65 We agree that, despite ample overlap, the statutes do 
not criminalize precisely the same conduct.  See Miller v. 
Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 144–45, 153–54 n.16 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(affirming preliminary injunction of child pornography 
prosecution under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6312, without deciding 
whether minor “wrapped in a white, opaque towel, just below 
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our looser categorical approach, we require no such direct 
match to establish that Portanova’s conviction is one “relating 
to . . . the . . . possession . . . of child pornography.”66   
 
Applying this broader meaning of “relating to,” 
Portanova’s prior Pennsylvania conviction stands in some 
relation and pertains to “the . . . possession . . . of child 
pornography,” and the § 2252(b) mandatory minimum applies.  
Surveying the interrelationship between the statutes, it is 
readily apparent that the crimes share a logical connection 
between them.  Both statutes focus on the same actus rei, 
including possession and distribution, and, with narrow 
exception, define nearly identical subject matter as child 
pornography.  In effect, they “target the same, core criminal 
conduct such that they are ‘directly analogous.’”67  Portanova’s 
 
 
her breasts” constituted “nudity . . . depicted for the purpose of 
sexual stimulation or gratification.”); Commonwealth v. 
Moyer, No. 742 MDA 2016, 2017 WL 809862, at *4 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 2017) (evidence sufficient to support 
conviction where nude minors were provocatively posed, 
without reference to genital exposure); see also Salmoran, 909 
F.3d at 79–80 (“The state statute, meanwhile, applies to any 
nudity—and not necessarily that which shows genitals or the 
pubic area—depicted for the purpose of sexual stimulation or 
gratification.”) (concluding that nearly identical N.J. Stat. 
§ 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b) criminalizing “[n]udity, if depicted for the 
purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification of any person 
who may view such depiction” is broader than § 2256(2)(A)). 
66 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1). 
67 Williams, 880 F.3d at 105 (quoting Flores, 856 F.3d 
at 291) (emphasis added). 
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reading of the Pennsylvania statute to cover additional types of 
nudity is insufficient to disrupt the nexus between the 
possession of “child pornography,” “prohibited sexual acts” 
and their defined subject matter under Pennsylvania law and 
the possession of child pornography, “sexually explicit 
conduct,” and its subject matter under federal law.   
 
Portanova’s prior Pennsylvania conviction, then, is one 
“relating to . . . the . . . possession . . . of child pornography,” 
and the sentencing enhancement provision applies.   
 
B. 
 
Portanova also argues that the breadth and 
indeterminacy of § 2252(b)(1)’s “relating to” language is 
unconstitutionally vague, failing to give fair warning or notice 
and violating the Due Process Clause.68  
  
“The void-for-vagueness doctrine reflects the 
fundamental principle that, in order to comply with the 
requirements of due process, a statute must give fair warning 
of the conduct that it prohibits.”69  “[T]he Fifth Amendment’s 
vagueness doctrine bars the Government from ‘taking away 
someone’s life, liberty, or property under a criminal law so 
vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the 
conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary 
 
 
68 See United States v. Fontaine, 697 F.3d 221, 226 (3d 
Cir. 2012). 
69 Id. (citing Bouie, 378 U.S. at 351); see also United 
States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2325 (2019); Johnson, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2556. 
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enforcement.’”70  “These principles apply to laws ‘defining 
elements of crimes’ or ‘fixing sentences.’”71  “Because 
vagueness challenges are evaluated ‘on a case by case basis[,]’ 
we must examine” the statute to determine if it “is vague as 
applied” to Portanova.72   
 
Applying a broad meaning of “relating to” adopted by 
the Supreme Court and our Court, we examine the statutory 
definitions of Portanova’s crime of conviction and determine 
whether it is categorically a law “relating to . . . the . . . 
possession . . . of child pornography,” as generically 
understood under federal law.  As we explained earlier, we find 
that it does, and that the application of these principles in a 
broader but straightforward reading of the text does not render 
the statute unconstitutionally vague. 
 
We find further support for this conclusion in Lockhart 
v. United States, in which the Supreme Court examined another 
part of § 2252(b)(2), addressing the issue of “whether the 
 
 
70 United States v. Green, 898 F.3d 315, 319 (3d Cir. 
2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1590 (2019) (quoting Johnson, 
135 S. Ct. at 2556). 
71 Id. (quoting Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556). 
72 Moreno v. Attorney Gen. of United States, 887 F.3d 
160, 165 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 
961 F.2d 1125, 1136 (3d Cir. 1992)).  Similarly, the rule of 
lenity operates “to resolve ambiguity in favor of the defendant 
only ‘at the end of the process of construing what Congress has 
expressed’ when the ordinary canons of statutory construction 
have revealed no satisfactory construction.’”  Lockhart, 136 S. 
Ct. at 968. 
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phrase ‘involving a minor or ward’ modifies all items in the list 
of predicate crimes . . . or only the one item that immediately 
precedes it.”73  There, the Supreme Court interpreted 
§ 2252(b)(2) based on “sensible grammatical principle 
buttressed by the statute’s text and structure” and declined to 
apply the rule of lenity.74  Though Lockhart did not reach the 
issue of “[w]hether the terms in § 2252(b)(2) are given their 
‘generic’ meaning . . . or are defined in light of their federal 
counterparts,” or address unconstitutional vagueness, it 
concluded that § 2252(b)(2)’s terms “are unlikely to sweep in 
the bizarre or unexpected state offenses.”75 
 
Accordingly, there is no question that a person of 
ordinary intelligence would have fair warning that a conviction 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2252 could expose him to greater 
penalties if such a person has a prior state conviction “relating 
to . . . the . . . possession . . . of child pornography.”  As a 
result, § 2252(b)(1)’s sentencing enhancement provision is not 
unconstitutionally vague.76   
 
 
73 Lockhart, 136 S. Ct. at 961.   
74 Id. at 968.   
75 Id. 
76 This result is consistent with the conclusions of our 
sister circuits in unpublished decisions.  See United States v. 
Geasland, 694 F. App’x 422, 439 n.8 (7th Cir. 2017) (mere 
possibility of constitutional vagueness argument does not 
render application of § 2252(b)(2)’s “relating to” language 
plain error), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 699 (2018); United States 
v. Caldwell, 655 F. App’x 730, 732–33 (11th Cir. 2016) (mere 
breadth of § 2252(b)(1) is insufficient for unconstitutional 
vagueness).  Similarly, because the statute is not ambiguous, 
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III. 
 
Because we conclude that Portanova’s prior conviction 
is among those “relating to . . . the . . . possession . . . of child 
pornography,” and that the provision is not unconstitutionally 
vague, he is subject to the fifteen-year mandatory minimum 
sentence imposed by the District Court under § 2252(b)(1), and 
we will affirm.   
 
 
the rule of lenity has no place.  See Lockhart, 136 S. Ct. at 968 
(“[T]he arguable availability of multiple, divergent principles 
of statutory construction cannot automatically trigger the rule 
of lenity.”). 
